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Abstract—Networked infrastructures underpin most social
and economical interactions nowadays and have become an
integral part of the critical infrastructure. Their continuous
and uninterrupted operation relies heavily on the performance
of the various networked elements that compose the internal
and external functionality of the overall ICT system. Thus, it
is crucial that heterogeneous networked environments provide
adequate resilience in order to satisfy the quality requirements
of the user. In order to achieve this, a coordinated approach to
confront any challenges is required. However, there is additional
complexity since challenges manifest themselves under different
circumstances in the various infrastructure components. The
objective of this paper is to present a multi-level resilience
approach that goes beyond the traditional monolithic resilience
schemes that focus mainly on one infrastructure component.
The proposed framework considers four main aspects, i.e. users,
application, network and system. The latter three are part of
the technical infrastructure while the former profiles the service
user. This paper illustrates how an integrated approach coor-
dinating knowledge from the different infrastructure elements
allows a more effective detection of challenges and facilitates the
use of autonomic principles employed during the remediation
against challenges. In order to demonstrate the feasibility of
the framework we analyse two scenarios of unified networked
environments.
Index Terms—Resilience, Autonomic Networks, Network Ar-
chitectures, Anomaly Detection, Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer networks constitute the backbone of today’s in-
formation society by providing connectivity between people
as well as ICT (Information Communication Technology)
systems. Consequently, they are increasingly mission-critical,
especially when used as part of always-on services and appli-
cations (e.g., Web-services, Internet Television, Cloud appli-
cations, etc.), domain specific safety-critical services (e.g., Air
Traffic Control (ATC) networks), critical management services
for operators (e.g., Utility networks), and critical real-time
financial services (e.g., stock-market systems). The security
and resilience of such infrastructures is therefore paramount
but at the same time becomes increasingly difficult to achieve.
Hence, the development of resilience mechanisms has to be
a prime objective within the design and engineering process
of any system or network [1], [3]. However, in the past,
availability was the main concern in the design and operation
of computer networks [1] and less emphasis was placed on
resilience aspects. Moreover, within the actual deployment
of networks and ICT systems resilience aspects have also
often been treated as add-on and resilience mechanisms have
been implemented without reference to a generic resilience
framework [1]. Trying to increase system resilience later
by deploying such a generic resilience framework leads to
monolithic solutions that mainly consider a part or a particular
communication layer only. Thus, they usually focuses on a
particular resilience sub-domain (e.g., fault-tolerance [5], se-
curity [2], [3], or survivability [4]) and do not look at the over-
all system resilience. More advanced resilient schemes that
propose cross-layering methods (e.g. [6], [7]) tend to neglect
higher-layer features that express the explicit requirements
and characteristics of service users. Hence, their formulation
results in one-dimensional performance-oriented solutions that
strictly focus on traditional network performance metrics (e.g.
throughput, delay, jitter) but avoid mapping these metrics onto
the overall end-user QoE and QoS. Therefore, such approaches
lead to what we consider "single-level" approaches.
In order to provide a better overall resilience it is therefore
necessary to integrate and co-ordinate the provisioning of
resilience across different layers and system components. This
should also help to provide more adequate end-user QoE
whilst satisfying the QoS requirements of the different system
elements. In order to achieve this we propose a generic
resilience framework that considers the overall impact of
simultaneous challenges to different infrastructure elements
and cases where the same challenge manifests themselves
differently in interdependent systems. With such a framework
it is possible to develop a resilience architecture that uses
autonomic properties to ensure the adaptability of different
networks and ICT systems and helps to improve overall
resilience.
In this paper we first present a multi-level resilience frame-
work that allows the construction of case-specific resilience
architectures that consider the various infrastructure levels
and further allowing the construction of user related meta-
data to better control and identify challenges. User-specific
requirements are considered in order to ensure that QoE
objectives related to a given resilience strategy are met. Due
to the multi-level persona of this framework it overcomes
the drawbacks of the traditional monolithic, single system
approaches as currently employed in some ICT infrastructure.
This is achieved by the joint analysis of challenge indicators
and co-ordinated detection actions that also help to coordinate
the remediation process at the different system elements.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II describes the requirements that such a framework
should comply with. Section III is dedicated at presenting
the concepts behind our resilience framework and Section IV
illustrates the practical aspect of our framework within two
case studies. Finally Section V concludes and summarises this
work.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR RESILIENCE IN UNIFIED
NETWORKED ICT ENVIRONMENTS
Based on the argumentation developed earlier, we conclude
that a generic resilience framework should confront the fol-
lowing requirements:
1) Due to the ubiquitous and user-centric persona of todays
ICT environments, a resilience framework should con-
sider various levels of communication; thus, it should be
a multi-level resilience framework.
2) A multi-level resilience framework should allow the
composition of practical resilience architectures that
enable the direct description of a user over a service
that is provided within a networked environment.
3) Users should be represented as a meta-feature by three
core levels: the application/service, network and system.
In this way, any analysis over the framework would
assess the end-user QoE and QoS.
4) Such a framework should manage, process and intelli-
gently analyse heterogeneous data gathered from multi-
ple sources of information within a common knowledge
plane.
5) The knowledge plane of such a framework should be
in perfect synchronisation with the control, data and
management planes.
6) An efficient synergistic deployment of the knowledge
plane with the rest will enable a given resilience ar-
chitecture the autonomic properties of self-awareness,
self-management, self-optimization and self-defence.
7) Apart from its collaborative behaviour with the remain-
ing planes, the knowledge plane via its self-awareness
and self-defence capabilities should be in charge of
initially detecting and characterising a challenge (e.g.
attack, link failure). Subsequently it should inform the
control plane of which remediation actions should be
triggered based on the components that initiate the
properties of self-management and self-optimization.
Therefore we propose a generic multi-level resilience frame-
work that aims to match the majority of the requirements
specified. Its description is provided in the next section.
III. MULTI-LEVEL RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK
The design of a robust multi-level resilience framework
had to fully comply with the requirements provided earlier
Fig. 1. Conceptual representation of Multi-Level Resilience
(Sectio II). Firstly, the main design consideration was to
determine the levels of information that such a framework
should process in order to compose meaningful metadata for
the user. Secondly, the design process had to specify the exact
type of analysis to be anticipated by each plane and further
associate the activities of the control, data, management and
knowledge planes in an optimal manner.
As evidenced by Fig. 1, the most important functional block
within our design is the adequate representation of a user of
an infrastructure. Thus, we aim at describing a user based on
three levels of observation; the application/service, network
and system levels. Our design argues that measurements of
features related with any of these three levels is feasible
under the assumption that a given resilience architecture that
follows our framework will be deployed under standardized
monitoring and measurement methods (e.g. SNMP, NetFlow,
syslog etc.).
A. Self-awareness & self-defence
All gathered information from all the three different levels
will be pre-processed at the management plane and further
analysed on the knowledge plane. Fig 2 provides a visual
example of how initially a client is meta-represented by the
three different levels within the knowledge plane. The exem-
plar profiling case of Fig 2 illustrates the scenario of a ramp-up
behaviour in all the three levels of observation due to the byte
consumption caused by a particular application/service.
Nevertheless, given the initial user (or group of users)
profiling, the knowledge plane will enforce a dedicated com-
ponent within its internal structure to perform a statistical
characterisation of a user’s activities within the observational
timeframe. Apart from developing a user-specific profile, this
statistical characterisation will also be aggregated for all the
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Fig. 2. An example of representing a single user based on the three levels
of system, network and application/service.
users and further correlated with the monitoring and measure-
ment components of the control and the data plane. Hence,
an overall characterisation of the environment is achieved and
self-awareness is ensured.
Naturally, the overall characterisation complies with a par-
ticular mathematical model which is in a position to determine
the levels of normality, thus detecting abnormal characteristics
in real-time. Under the scenario of detecting an anomalous
pattern, components within the management plane will be in
charge of informing the knowledge plane. Consequently, the
knowledge plane will update the overall statistical characteri-
zation of its profiling on a set of users and further trigger fine-
grained analysis in order to diagnose the exact cause of the
anomaly. Given the outcome of this fine-grained analysis, the
knowledge plane will inform the management plane in order to
trigger remediation techniques and dimension the environment
resources accordingly. Thus, the property of self-defence is
accommodated.
B. Self-management & self-optimization
Remediation of challenges is resulted after a coordinated act
by the management and knowledge planes. In particular, the
management plane is the actual co-ordinator at the onset of an
event. Thus, the decision regarding the type of anomaly pro-
duced by the knowledge plane is sent over to the management
plane. Subsequently, the management plane initiates a policies
component that holds all the rules regarding the optimisation
and management procedures that need to be taken within the
ICT environment.
According to the rules provided by the policies compo-
nent, immediate policies regarding traffic engineering actions
(e.g. refined routing decisions, blocking) will be triggered
and further received by the control plane. Eventually, the
internal mechanisms of the control plane will re-configure
the associated settings on the hardware (e.g. routers, sensors)
and subsequently update the forwarding schemes within the
data plane. Given all the remediation operations described,
the properties of self-management and self-optimization for
the ICT environment are empowered by our generic multi-
level resilience framework.
IV. MULTI-LEVEL RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK : IN
PRACTISE
A. Case Study 1: Multi-level Resilience over the Cloud for
Malware Detection
Under the abstractions provided by our multi-level resilience
framework (Section III) it was feasible to derive a prototype
resilience architecture explicitly for the identification and
detection of malware over cloud environments [8]. The overall
architecture of our approach can be seen in Figure 3. For
simplicity only three nodes are shown and the network connec-
tions between nodes are omitted. Each node has a hypervisor,
a host Virtual Machine (VM) and a number of guest VMs.
Within the host VM of each node there is a dedicated Cloud
Resilience Manager (CRM) which comprises one part of the
wider detection system. The software components within the
CRM are the Network Analysis Engine (NAE), the System
Analysis Engine (SAE), the System Resilience Engine (SRE)
and the Coordination and Organisation Engine (COE).
The CRM on each node performs local malware detection
based on the information obtained from its node’s VMs and
its local network view; this is handled by the SAE and NAE
components respectively. The SRE component is in charge of
protection and remediation actions based on the output from
the analysis engines (i.e. NAE and SAE). Such actions include
destroying an infected VM or blocking information destined
to a vulnerable VM. Finally, the COE component coordinates
and disseminates information between other instances and,
in parallel, controls the components within its own node. In
addition to system level resilience, the detection system is
capable of gathering and analysing data at the network level
through the deployment of Network Monitors each containing
a network CRM as shown in Figure 1. This monitoring
system is directly connected to each Ingress/Egress Router as
shown, and can gather features from all traffic passing through
it. Nevertheless, the case study of this section is explicitly
addressing the operations of the NAE and SAE engines
using the example of characterising and detecting the Kelihos
malware [9]. In general, the NAE and SAE engines enable the
autonomic properties of self-awareness, self-management and
self-defence since they could synergistically provide an overall
characterisation on a system, network and application/service
level alongside an indication regarding the existence of a
malware.
1) NAE & SAE Description:: Both engines are composed
by several scripts that automate all the processes referring
to the pre-processing of either network or system data. The
integration of the aforementioned scripts is in practise em-
powering the aspect of self-management within the overall
architecture. Their pre-processing outputs are subsequently fed
as the primitive input for the analysis algorithms which are
also integrated and they employ Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) 1 and statistical timeseries on the jointly gathered
1Due to the fact that we did not change the implementation of the traditional
PCA algorithm we do not present the mathematical formulation of PCA. For
the definition of the PCA algorithm we refer the reader to [10].
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Fig. 3. Resilience Architecture over a Cloud Scenario for Malware Detection
system and network features. Hence the produced outputs
are also considered as important aiding elements towards the
establishment of the self-awareness and self-defence properties
where the former enables the adequate characterisation of the
three levels of network, system and application/service and the
latter achieves malware detection. Undoubtedly, the outcomes
for both SAE and NAE, in conjunction with the communica-
tion allowed by the COE establish a robust architecture that
complies with the generic requirements stated in Section II.
2) Experimentation Setup: The main objective behind
this experimental setup was to illustrate a robust character-
ization and malware detection strategy as part of the over-
all resilience architecture presented earlier. In particular, we
aimed at assessing the fundamental property of VM/service
“live” migration as initiated in todays’ cloud environments and
further investigate on how malware can be detected in such a
scenario within a controlled experimental testbed. The testbed
consists of three physical nodes where the two run a number
of VMs that behave as HTTP servers. Each physical node
runs the Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM2) virtualization
infrastructure and the Quick EMUlator (QEMU3) for hardware
emulation whereas the migration functionality is enabled with
the use of libvirt4. The third physical node is used for
emulating background traffic that is mainly composed by a
variety of random client requests to the VM’s HTTP servers
which were achieved with custom scripts.
The experiment lasted for 20 minutes and the Kelihos
malware strain, Trojan.Kelihos-5, was injected on the 9th
minute in one of the HTTP servers whereas on the 10th
minute the infected VM was migrated to the second ”clean”
physical host as manually commanded by the management
host. Throughout the whole experiment there was the con-
sistent aggreagted monitoring of system-related features (e.g.
counts of processes) and network packets for all VMs on
both physical hosts from the hypervisor level using custom
monitoring scripts embedded in the NAE and SAE. Finally, the
aggregated system and network features where subsequently
fed to our implemented PCA algorithm in order to firstly
chartacterize the joint dataset and further pinpoint possible
anomalous characteristics.
2Kernel-based Virtual Machine: http://www.linux-kvm.org/
3QUEMU:http://www.quemu.org/
4The virtualization API: http://libvirt.org/libvirt2
3) Results: As evidenced by Fig. 4, each joint dataset is
divided into 3-second bins, and each bin is converted into
a feature vector per each VM node. The combined feature
vector was submitted to PCA to obtain the k-subspace which
corresponds to the normal behaviour of the traffic, and spans
from a principal component pc1, through pck, whereas the
remaining subspace with the less significant principal compo-
nents (i.e, pck+1 through pcm) maps the anomalous behaviour
with respect to the variance of the dataset. Subsequently, we
compute a distance metric that describes the magnitude of
the projection of the original data points into the anomalous
subspace to quantify their malicious behaviour which we use
to produce the anomaly score graph (ASG) in Fig. 4. In
practise, this plot that is generated by the NAE is a time-series
representation which summarizes the anomalous score of each
bin in the trace and thus indicates the level of how anomalous
is each tested timebin with respect to the other measurement
bins. Overall, the PCA performed extremely well and was able
to show a sharp increase on the ASG plot as demonstrated by
Fig. 4 as soon as the Kelihos malware was injected (≈ 160th
bin in Fig. 4). Moreover, the ASG plot also shows that the
PCA algorithm could also identify anomalous activity after
the VM migration performed right after the 200th time bin.
The outcomes of the PCA analysis that was achieved
via the proposed resilience arhitecture has demonstrated the
benefits of complying with some basic resilience requirements
derived by the generic resilience framework presented earlier.
Via the proposed architecture and the selected case study
we have shown that by considering sources of information
from different communication layers (i.e. system, network and
application), the properties of self-awareness, sef-management
and self-defence were met in the explicit case of cloud envi-
ronments.
B. Case Study 2: Multi-level Resilience in Access Networks
for Characterization & Detection of Systematic Downloads
The increasing Internet use has unavoidably brought is-
sues raised with respect to the excessive usage of several
application-layer services. In particular, systematic downloads
performed at services offered by academic websites (e.g. IEE-
EXplore) have become commonplace and consequently lead
academic institutional campus networks being blacklisted [11].
Thus, given the properties of our generic framework presented
earlier (Section III) we have derived formulations in order
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Time (1 bin = 3 seconds)
An
om
al
y 
st
at
is
tic
s
Anomaly Score Graph (ASG)
Kelihos Injection
VM Migration
Fig. 4. Output of the resulting PCA-based anomaly detection as jointly performed on network and system data that were monitored by the NAE and SAE.
to adequately detect systematic downloads using time series
models. As already being well known techniques timeseries
analysis have been used to model Internet traffic and DOS
attacks [12], [13], [14].
In this work, the number of requests per second made to a
specific publisher as obtained from the proxy logs captured at
a proxy server on the Indian Institute of Technology Madras
campus is used to model the time series. In order to build
robust models, the data is obtained for 106 such publishers
where each one is represented by a different timeseries since
license agreements with each is likely to be different. Hence
our modelling approach complies with the principles of our
generic framework (section III) since it considers application-
specific requirements gathered from the application layer and
aim to provide network-based knowledge with respect to user
utilisation on a particular service. We following describe the
specifics of our modelling scheme by first starting with the
model identification.
1) Model Identification: The type and order of our model
is obtained by first considering the autocorrelation function
(ACF) of the time series. Similar to the work in [14], it
was observed that the ACF of the differenced timeseries was
stationary and could be modeled as an Auto Regressive (AR)
process
∆(xn) = yn = xn − xn−1 (1)
yn =
p∑
k=1
akyn−k + en (2)
where en is the prediction error assumed to be a generated
by a white noise process. In parallel, the order of the model
is estimated again from the ACF of the differenced series as
shown in Figure 6. The differencing operation aims to address
the non-anomalous structural breaks disclosed within network
data where average statistics can vary depending upon the
downloading time (prime versus nonprime time).
2) Emulation and detection of Systematic downloads:
By virtue of privacy constraints, access to data corresponding
to the investigated systematic downloads was not feasible.
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Fig. 5. Autocorrelation function of differenced data before (left) and after
differencing (right) in order to estimate the order of the model regarding a
publisher(s) timeseries.
Therefore we have used the setup given in Fig. 7 in order
to generate anomalous data. The traces of normal data as
obtained from the proxy logs were first generated and subse-
quently interspersed with systematic download. The emulation
setup consisted of varying each of the following parameters:
1) Number of files downloaded
2) Files downloaded at random time intervals
3) Different sizes of files downloaded
4) Random ordering of files of different sizes
After obtaining the emulation logs we formed the timeseries
by computing the number of requests at different polling
intervals varying from 5-30 seconds in 5 second bins. The
time-dependent AR process was modelled with a framelength
of 3 minutes and we further computed the AR process roots.
We have identified a specific root which characterised the
anomaly and was obtained by using ground truth data (i.e.
the location of the region when systematic downloads are
in progress), and feature selection (albeit root selection) was
performed using the algorithm suggested in [15]. The AR
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
55
Real Part
Im
ag
in
ar
y 
Pa
rt
C
A
B
Fig. 6. Roots of the time-varying AR model during periods of both
systematic downloads (clusters A,B) and normal downloads (cluster C)
Fig. 7. Emulation Architecture for Achieving a Systematic Downloads
Scenario.
process roots are shown in Figure 5 where different colours are
associated with the roots corresponding to that of systematic
download and normal traffic. In general, it is evidenced that the
roots associated to that of systematic downloads (marked with
A and C) are closer to the unit circle and belong to a different
cluster compared to that of a normal download (marked with
B).
Overall, this exemplar scenario has considered service-level
requirements in order to become self-aware regarding the
utilisation of a given networked environment. Moreover, the
proposed mechanisms are currently employed as intelligent
functional elements within the network management software
of this particular campus network and empower the aspect
of self-management and further aid the properties of self-
optimization and self-defence of the overall network manage-
ment process.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Today’s networked ICT environments are increasingly chal-
lenged by misuse and security issues. These manifest them-
selves at different levels of the system architecture and are so
far dealt with independently at the different levels. This paper
introduces a multi-level resilience framework in which the re-
silience activities (such as anomaly detection) are co-ordinated
in order to provide better and early defence and awareness
regarding threats and challenges. This paper illustrates that
architectures that comply with the requirements derived from
the generic multi-level resilience framework can adequately
relate several types of information with respect to application,
system and network-specific characteristics. Further, we show
how mechanisms that confront particular challenges at the
different levels at which they are likely to manifest themselves
can be co-ordinated and hence produce a better result. This
is demonstrated through case studies focusing on the central
aspects of analysis and aggregation of heterogeneous types
of information. These case studies look at the three proposed
levels and how these relate to the generic framework. We argue
that our suggested framework sets new horizons towards the
development of autonomic and intelligent mechanisms within
the area of network management and will ensure a robust
scheme for adaptive resilient and secure solutions.
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